In Kalif Robinson’s post, “President Magufuli Could Wipe Out an Already Flawed Democracy in Tanzania,” he points out the populist tendencies of President John Magufuli, the President of Tanzania since the November 2015 elections. By pointing out these tendencies, Robinson concludes that President Magufuli is running an authoritarian regime. However, as he points out in his title, the democracy in Tanzania has been flawed for a long time (arguably since its conception). I agree with Robinson’s conclusion of the authoritarian regime that Magufuli is approaching, and propose to take it further in light of recent events in Tanzania, to show why we should be worried about what used to be known as the most peaceful country in Africa.
The election wasn’t entirely smooth sailing for CCM, with election controversy in Zanzibar, a common occurrence in less developed democracies. Nancy Bermeo mentions in her article regarding democratic deconsolidation that manipulating elections is a possible indicator of democratic erosion. While it may not be concluded that there were electoral shenanigans, so to speak, this is a common perception. This indicates a general lack of faith in democratic functioning in Tanzania, something that Foa and Mounk cite as an indicator that something might be going wrong in a democracy. Even in the general elections, applying Robert Dahl’s concept of contestation and inclusivity in elections, just from the numbers it looks dire for inclusivity; of over 23 million registered voters, 15 million actually voted. The cards aren’t in favor of contestation either. The shooting of a powerful critic, Tundu Lissu, doesn’t exactly scream healthy regard for free speech. It remains to be seen how unhealthy this regard is once Lissu goes back to run in the 2020 general elections. This lack of contestation is also alluded to by, if not outright proven by, the fact that no party has ever been in power except CCM, which gives the eternal ruling party of Tanzania even more incentive to continue to break the democratic bargain, as articulated by Schmitter, by changing the norms that govern political discourse in the country.
Magufuli’s by-the-book populist ideology doesn’t end here. Not only has he delegitimized the media, but he has also pushed forward laws to curb free speech, especially on the internet, leading to many bloggers being unable to continue their critiques of his establishment. This effort to delegitimize and curb the media is part of his strategy to distort the perception of what popular will really is, something that Galston points out. The electorate in Tanzania, being a developing country, is comparatively uneducated by and large, making them more susceptible to control of the media that they have access to. This lack of education, along with lower income, also makes them more likely to support alternatives to democracy, as Wike and Fetterolf come to the conclusion of their report on Liberal Democracies in Crisis. Magufuli played to this strength so well that it’s unlikely it was accidental when he criticized the previous president, Jakaya Kikwete, for his economic decisions that, in his narrative, hurt the average Tanzanian citizen, a fitting example of how the economy affects the rise of populism, also from Galston. His open criticism of Kikwete also falls within Mueller’s conception of a populist being against the “corrupt elite,” a narrative that the former president commonly fell into when criticized during his time in office. Magufuli’s campaign slogan was, in fact, “Hapa Kazi Tu” which translates roughly to “Strictly Business Here,” meant as a direct reference to the corruption that citizens of Tanzania associated with governmental bureaucracies.
This strong anti-corruption and anti-elite ethic, along with a strong dose of nationalistic morality brought to economics, support Seymour Lipset’s theory of economic development stabilizing a democracy. Tanzania, being a developing country with high levels of economic inequality, already had what Kalif Robinson calls a “fragile democracy.” I propose, however, that Lipset’s relation could go in the converse direction to theorize that populism, especially in already economically vulnerable economies, can lead to an even poorer economy to create a vicious cycle of weak democracy and a weak economy. In Tanzania, this can be seen empirically insofar as after Magufuli came into power, the Tanzanian economy has weakened, according to the International Monetary Fund.
To conclude, President John Magufuli came into power and made a substantial amount of changes. In fact, he’s still making a substantial amount of changes, even the year before his first elections as an incumbent. Kalif Robinson’s article is a very satisfactory, summative look at what Magufuli had already done as of 2017, and I have extended his argument to show how Magufuli does, indeed, follow the populist authoritarian playbook. Applying a theory is only so useful insofar as it helps us predict what might happen, and the prognosis for Tanzania is not promising. From Bermeo’s conception of a populist, we can expect something more from Magufuli, namely a “promissory coup.” If one wasn’t worried about extreme, prolonged democratic erosion in Tanzania, then let this analysis serve as a warning about a fragile democracy, previously known only for its minerals and hospitality towards tourists: we should start worrying.