The Law and Justice Party and Jaroslaw Kaczynski, because of their rise to power in 2015, appear to have similar roots as other populist movements across Europe in the 2008 recession. However, this is not the case. Poland, since the fall of the Soviet Union, has performed well economically. Initially, this growth did not progress evenly as the employment levels rose to 20% by 2004 [1]. From an economic perspective, this was the worst period for Poland since the end of Communist occupation. After entry into the EU in 2004 Poland’s unemployment decreased by 12% and their average yearly earnings had nearly doubled by 2016 [2]. The recession in 2008 had a much smaller effect on Poland than it did in other European countries [3].

Poland’s economic situation was not perfect when the Law and Justice took power in 2015 but it was not as bad as the Polish people had perceived it to be. This economic growth does not fit into the Populist narrative of the Law and Justice party. As Kendall-Taylor and Frantz explain, populist leaders “share a disdain for institutions and a deep distrust of perceived experts and elites” [4]. The Law and Justice party and Kaczynski have been able to harbor a deep distrust of “post-communist elites” in Poland. They have instilled within the Polish electorate, a disbelief in the information of experts, as Poles consistently assess the general economic situation to be poor since the fall of Communism but report individual improvements [5]. This perspective suggests the successful use of typically populist rhetoric. Muller describes the populist viewpoint as a “particular moralistic imagination of politics, a way of perceiving the political world that sets a morally pure and fully unified, but ultimately fictional, people against elites who are deemed corrupt or in some other way morally inferior” [6]. Kaczynski and his party have been able to instill these feelings deep within Poles.

The important takeaway of the dichotomy expressed above is that populism does not have to deal with factual recessions or inequalities to play upon the citizenry and gain political power. Many scholars link the two together but this is not a necessary condition for the growth of such movements. This hinges on an important aspect of Muller’s definition of populism, the imaginary nature of populist rhetoric [7]. Populists frame their arguments outside of policy debates and political representation, they flip these discussions on their heads and discount facts in the favor of their simplistic and unprovable rhetoric.

The difference between normal political tactics and populist arguments, such as the Law and Justice Party’s, is that standard political rhetoric “makes representative claims in the form of something like hypotheses that can be empirically disproven on the basis of the actual results of regular procedures and institutions like elections” [8]. Populists move this debate outside of the provable and disprovable in order to sway their constituents into believing that they are being taken advantage of by the fair and typical democratic practices that, in the Polish perspective especially, are helping the country grow. Instead of operating within the political apparatus to instigate the changes they want to see, they dangerously claim that the processes holding democracy in balance are the culprits for the problems that their people have (whether real or imaginary).

The Polish case illuminates the fact that populism can grow without a real economic decline and in the three years since the rise of the Law and Justice Party, it has also shown us the danger of such parties. Populists, Kaczynski included, argue that the existing institutions are the root cause of the problems in their country [9]. Once in power, it follows that they would try to consolidate power and unbalance the balance between democratic institutions. We have seen this in the Polish context, as the Law and Justice Party has waged war against the courts. The Law and Justice party have been able to amend laws on common courts and take the power of the National Council of the Judiciary and the Constitutional Tribunal. The Supreme Court may soon follow, as the party is set to control upcoming appointments to the Court [10]. This case demonstrates the danger of populists in two key ways. It first shows how populist rhetoric can stray from the facts of the situation and still be successful. Secondly, it illuminates how dangerous this rhetoric can be when put in power.

Works Cited:

1. Owczarek, Dominik. The roots of populism in Poland: Unsustainable growth and cultural backlash. Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, April 2017. https://www.cidob.org/en/articulos/cidob_report/n1_1/the_roots_of_populism_in_poland_unsustainable_growth_and_cultural_backlash
2. Owczarek. The roots of populism in Poland.
3. Owczarek. The roots of populism in Poland.
4. Kendall-Taylor, Andrea & Erica Frantz. How Democracies Fall Apart: Why Populism is a Pathway to Autocracy. Foreign Affairs. December 5, 2016, Pg. 2.
5. Owczarek. The roots of populism in Poland.
6. Muller, Jan-Werner. 2016. What Is Populism? Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, Pg. 19.
7. Muller, What is Populism? Pg. 19.
8. Muller, What is Populism? Pg. 36.
9. Davies, Christian. Hostile Takeover: How Law and Justice Captured Poland’s Courts, Freedom House, May 2018, Pg. 2.
10. Davies, Hostile Takeover, Pg. 6.