Feb 12, 2020

Putin’s Constitutional Amendments: A Further Deterioration of Russian Democracy

Written By: Martine Bjoernstad

Since Vladimir Putin was re-elected as President of Russia in 2018 questions have arisen as to what role he will play in the Russian government once his presidential term ends in 2024. In his State of the Nation address last month, President Putin seems to have provided answers. Calling for constitutional reforms that will alter the existing power-structure (1), Putin is ensuring his continued dominance in Russian politics beyond his presidency and contributes to further deteriorate and erode the Russian democracy.  

Democratic erosion refers to the process in which elected leaders undermine the established democracy from within, often using the democratic institutions. Constitutional amendments are one way in which executives have been known to weaken democracy and enhance their own power and influence—it is this process we are currently observing in Russia under President Putin. 

On January 15th, Putin addressed the Russian nation in the yearly State of the Nation address. In his speech, Putin expressed his plans to alter the power structure of the government by amending the constitution. The proposed changes will transfer powers from the president to the State Duma, the Russian parliament, ultimately weakening executive power and enhancing legislative power. Among other changes, the president will be subject to term limits and lose the power to appoint the prime minister, as well as other government ministers (2).

Generally, it is considered beneficial to the state of democracy when the legislative branch is empowered and the executive branch is restrained. Putin himself argued in his speech that the amendments will enhance democracy and better the governance of the Russian Federation (3). Nevertheless, numerous experts are approaching the reforms with skepticism. While the constitutional amendments institute additional checks and balances and a more comprehensive division of power, the reforms are perceived to further erode the Russian democracy by facilitating Putin’s ability to maintain power beyond his presidential term (4). Fear has also arisen that the proposed amendments have the potential of transforming Russia into a one-party state, thus further undermining the competition necessary for a democracy to exist. 

President Putin has presided over the Russian Federation for two decades and has arguably contributed to the failure of democratic consolidation in Russia (5). Drawing upon the argument presented by Levitsky and Ziblatt in their book, How Democracies Die, Putin’s leadership style appears consistent with their characterization of an authoritarian politician. Since Putin came to power in 2000, various instances of curtailed civil liberties, tolerated violence, and fierce resistance and denial of opponents’ legitimacy and ability to compete in elections, have made international headlines. Though frightening, it is perhaps not surprising that Putin is now initiating reforms that will preserve his grip on Russian governance. The proposed changes will limit the power of Putin’s successor, and open for Putin’s continued influence over Russian affairs, likely occupying a role within the newly empowered State Duma or State Council (6). 

The actions undertaken by Putin closely align with several theories put forward by scholars studying democratic erosion. Particularly interesting is it to evaluate Putin’s recent announcement in light of Aziz Huq and Tom Ginsburg’s book How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy. In their book, the two authors identify several pathways exploited by executive leaders to ensure their continued governance which further contributes to the deterioration of democracy. One of these pathways is constitutional amendments that serve to disadvantage the opposition and favor the incumbent. Coupled with Ozan Varol’s paper Stealth Authoritarianism, in which Varol outlines how autocratic leaders utilize the existing legal mechanisms to institute change, we get a clear idea of how Putin’s amendments are likely to undermine Russian democracy. 

Most, if not all, constitutions can legally be changed. Putin’s proposed amendments are thus not illegal but actually in accordance with the legal mechanisms established by the constitution itself. However, it can be argued that if a constitution is amended in ways that limit democracy, the established institutions are abused for undemocratic purposes. Effectively, Putin is legally undermining democracy. He is exploiting the democratic institutions and subverting democracy in order to empower his prospective role in the Russian government and weaken the power and ability of his successor. 

Some scholars suggest that the proposed constitutional amendments are just the beginning of Putin’s plan to retain power beyond 2024. Additional reforms are expected in the months and years ahead, likely contributing to further deteriorate the Russian democracy. Following the State of the Nation address, Putin’s primary political opponent, Alexei Navalny, was quick to criticize the reforms and express his belief that Putin will never truly concede power and that the amendments are all targeted towards ensuring Putin’s continued control (7). The status of the Russian democracy appears to be in a state of decline, and the central question of whether Putin will ever voluntarily concede power remains to be answered. 

Bibliography:

Gershkovich, Evan. 2020. “In Wake of Putin’s ‘Coup,’ Russia’s Top Opposition Leader Refrains From Action.” The Moscow Times, <www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/01/20/putin-coup-opposition-leader-navalny-a68973.> 

Huq, Aziz & Tom Ginsburg. 2017. “How to Lose a Constitutional Democracy.” Working Paper.

Krastev, Ivan. 2020. “Vladimir Putin’s New Orchestra.” The New York Times. <www.nytimes.com/2020/01/27/opinion/putin-government-change.html>. 

McFaul, Michael. 2018. “Choosing Autocracy: Actors, Institutions, and Revolution in the Erosion of Russian Democracy.” The Journal of Comparative Politics, Vol. 50, Nr. 3. <https://doi.org/10.5129/001041518822704971

Varol, Ozan. 2015. “Stealth Authoritarianism.” Iowa Law Review 100(4): pp. 1673-1742.

Roth, Andrew. 2020. “Russian Government Quits as Putin Plans to Stay in Power Past 2024.” The Guardian,<www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jan/15/putin-calls-for-constitution-changes-that-would-weaken-successor>. 

Treisman, Daniel. 2020. “Why Vladimir Putin Is Shaking up Russia.” CNN, <www.cnn.com/2020/01/15/opinions/putin-constitutional-changes-treisman/index.html>. 

Image:

Borodinova, Victoria. 2017. “Vladimir Putin .” Pixabay, <https://pixabay.com/illustrations/putin-the-president-of-russia-russia-2980748/>.  

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3 Comments

  1. Leilani Chew

    What I find particularly troubling is Putin’s justification for the new reforms, and how convincing they would be to someone who did not think to examine his motives and what he personally has to gain from the changes. This is a great example of one of Ozan Varol’s points in “Stealth Authoritarianism” that political leaders who use legal channels to bolster their political power often use rhetoric to justify it that invokes the ideas of rule of law and constitutionalism in order to deflect attention away from their true motives and disguise the reforms as positive for the survival of democracy.

  2. Troy Burgoyne

    Despite the power structure plans coming off as “beneficial to democracy”, I think it is absolutely valid to be skeptical of Putin’s intentions when it comes to changing the constitution or rules regarding the branches of government. We’ve seen the Russian President and his PM Dmitry Medvedev switch roles to consolidate and keep their influence on the executive roles to create a loophole out of the “no consecutive two term limit” in the constitution. We’ve also seen Putin having influence on Medvedev’s presidency, with terms being increased to six-years from four years which has benefited Putin. With the incontestable strength that Putin’s party United Russia also has, I feel as if it is too late to be worried about Russia turning into a one-party system, because it has already been one for a long time, especially since many opposition parties and politicians have been suppressed such as Alexei Navalny. Hope of having a Democratic Russia is definitely not like it was in 1991.

  3. Armin Amina

    Looking at Putin’s reforms and the purpose for what it is. I am surprised by what Putin is pushing for this change in constitutions to make the executive authority more limited and enhanced the legislative. So why is he doing this is the question for most people. Most of the liberal democracies are skeptical of the motivation of Putin. Most people know that Putin won’t be going anywhere any time soon and he might rule up to the 2030s. Watching this video here https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xjP12hWkcEw by Caspian Report. It gives a different perspective of what Putin wants to do. The basic argument by Shirvan is that Putin wants to create a strong cooperative institution for future presidents he will groom when he leaves office due to his mortality. No leader is supposed to rule forever, and he will die one day. So Putin’s goal is basically to try to create a strong institutional maybe democracy so that political infighting wouldn’t doom Russia as it happens back in the 1990s. In basic terms he wants an interdependence of the political factions to work together. In that, the future for Russia demographics isn’t good at all as the population is expected to decline heavily. By the time he leaves power Russia would lose most of its economy and industrial power. This is Putin’s biggest fear for this. So I would like to shed light while Putin is not democratic nor pro-freedom. The motivations are more complex, but Putin’s credibility for democracies isn’t great. Possibly, he might as well enhance his powers by absorbing Belarus the country into the Federation with the new constitution and continue his presidency till he died. But the argument I saw with Shirvan with Putin trying to create a Democracy. This isn’t a new experience for a personality authoritarian leader to do at the end of his power. Ataturk the father of modern-day Turkey was as well an authoritarian leader, but by the time in his end, he demanded democracy in the country and set up the institutions that would last up to Erdogan. Will this work? Is this the actual goal for Russia? Or is Putin still trying to enhance his powers up to his death?

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