The intricate relationship between authoritarian forms of contemporary populism and its potential implications on democratic order is incredibly important, but also, almost entirely paradoxical. On the one hand, populist leaders are often exceptionally effective in terms of their ability to champion the values, beliefs, and principles of potentially marginalized groups, ensuring that contemporary forms of democracy are more genuinely inclusive. On the other hand, the vast majority of today’s populist leaders have ascended to positions of power by way of undemocratic maneuvering, sociopolitical manipulation, and most prevalently, the deliberate dissemination of misinformation. Contemporary populists are not only dangerous because of how they manipulate voting behavior through their corruption of otherwise “democratic” means of information-sharing, but more importantly, because of how they emphasize divisiveness, hatred, xenophobia, anti-immigration sentiment, and dangerous forms of ultra-nationalism.
Although authoritative forms of populism have managed to penetrate the political frameworks of several countries around the globe, this particular assessment’s arguments and research will center on the rise and continued presence of populist leader and Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro. His ascent to political power has been criticized for relying on highly undemocratic methods of information-sharing, and for generally eroding the nation’s democratic institutions. Overall, it is argued that Bolsonaro’s road to power was highly reliant on largely undemocratic means of support. Also, his continued presence serves to repeatedly undermine the inclusive power-sharing mechanisms of Brazilian democracy. At the same time, however, his rise to power cannot be exclusively criticized for being a one-off instance of populist maneuvering. Instead, it highlights how lingering forms of crippling socioeconomic inequality, rapidly increasing unemployment, and intricate forms of corruption have led to the development of an extremely frustrated class of Brazilians.
The advent of authoritarian forms of populism is not exclusive to the 21st century, but more generally, has been a prevalent form of anti-establishmentarian political participation dating back to the nineteenth century (Stockemer 53). Contemporary populist leaders are not so different from their traditional counterparts, as they have also often ascended to power on the basis of their ability to create participatory platforms for otherwise marginalized components of society. Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro is no exception, as the president has gained power on the foundational bases of support for the country’s autocratic and dictatorial military institution, as well as his overtly nationalistic, xenophobic and borderline racist values, beliefs and principles.
In many ways, Bolsonaro’s emergence is owed to his emphasis of incredibly undemocratic value-systems in Brazil. These expressions are not only hateful in their rhetoric, but are also detrimental in terms of their implications on democratic political participation. For example, throughout the President’s initial electoral campaign, Bolsonaro has repeatedly criticized and ridiculed the country’s presidential election system, claiming that the two elections before his were fraudulent, and thus cannot be considered as democratic means of political participation. He has also developed an incredibly appalling track record for his misogynistic claims, which include “I wouldn’t rape you because you don’t deserve it” and “I’ve got five kids but on the fifth I had a moment of weakness and it came out a woman” and an even more disgusting reputation for xenophobia, with his claiming “The scum of the earth is showing up in Brazil, as if we didn’t have enough problems of our own to sort out” and “I visited a quilombo [traditionally black neighborhood] and the least heavy afro-descendant weighed seven arrobas (approximately 230 pounds). They do nothing! They are not even good for procreation” (Meredith, 2018). Much like many other contemporary populist leaders, Bolsonaro’s support is heavily reliant on his ability to appeal to a popular class of highly frustrated, historically marginalized, and largely uneducated members of Brazilian society. Their fears, suspicions, and conspiratorial theories are confirmed and “answered” by Bolsonaro.
Even more so, Bolsonaro’s rise has led to the creation of an incredibly divisive society, polarized by increasingly frustrated groups whose fears and concerns are being emphasized by the leader. The country’s polarization has not only impacted its political spaces, but has also damaged its general ability to create effective policy, respond to crisis, and commit to potential forms of positive socioeconomic change. The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace states “Polarization in Brazil has become a major risk not only to the country’s democracy but also to its capacity to address its most urgent policy challenges such as the coronavirus pandemic” (Stuenkel). The unprecedented degree of polarization being created by the far-right president has also led to massive amounts of popular opposition, often in the shape of grassroots-led protests, such as those recently seen due to civilian dislikes for how the president handled COVID-19. Bolsonaro has successfully mobilized his supporters against many opposition protests, potentially suggesting the use of force and violence, leading many to fear for the country’s long-term stability (Reeves).
Finally, Bolsonaro’s ability to erode democratic values is also heavily owed to the advent of social media. In many ways, the rise of contemporary populism has been inextricably linked to the development of social media, citizen journalism, and the general transformation of contemporary information-sharing mediums (Evangelista; Hameleers; Ricard & Medeiros). Much like a range of other populist leaders, Bolsonaro’s initial electoral campaign has been criticized for relying on manipulative forms of deceitful misinformation dissemination. Populist leaders often rely on the use of social media platforms to spread false information that can further emphasize their appeal to their target audience’s. For example, according to Evangelista et al., as well as Ricard and Medeiros, Bolsonaro’s 2018 election was heavily reliant on an outsourced private digital media company that organized a massive national campaign of disinformation, emphasizing already existing fears and sentiments, and creating entirely misplaced new ones. According to Hameleers, populist leaders all over the world have relied on the same tactic of social media derived misinformation dissemination.
Brazil is going through a declining economic and social phase. If Bolsonaro wins the upcoming 2022 election in Brazil, this will further continue and the end result will be a shift from democratic backsliding to democratic erosion. He retains a highly committed followership that is radicalized by the president’s sophisticated communication strategy and is unlikely to abandon the president even if Brazil’s economy deteriorates further. On the other hand, in support of the people, former president Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has stepped up and became a highly favored candidate for the next election. However, Neither candidate is gaining support from opposition sides. This is significant due to how highly polarized the country has become. Before picking a new leader, the Brazilian people should take note and asses the quality of their politicians. They must pick a leader who hears their voices and makes changes that positively impact the country not one that runs under no political affiliation and falsely promotes democracy.
Resources
Evangelista, Rafael, and Fernanda Bruno. “WhatsApp and political instability in Brazil: targeted messages and political radicalisation.” Internet Policy Review 8.4 (2019): 1-23. DOI: 10.14763/2019.4.1434
Stockemer, Daniel, Stockemer, and Glaeser. Populism around the world. Springer International Publishing, 2019.
Available at: https://doi.org/10.17645/pag.v8i1.2478
Available at: https://www.npr.org/2021/09/07/1034926745/facing-growing-opposition-brazils-bolsonaro-has-mobilized-his-supporters-to-prot.
Available at: https://misinforeview.hks.harvard.edu/article/using-misinformation-as-a-political-weapon-covid-19-and-bolsonaro-in-brazil/.
Available at: https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/02/17/brazil-s-polarization-and-democratic-risks-pub-83783.
Available at: https://www.cfr.org/event/bolsonaros-brazil-inside-look
Available at : https://www.nytimes.com/2021/09/07/world/americas/bolsonaro-brazil-protests.html
Hi Aziz! I really enjoyed reading this blog post; it was extremely informative and kept my attention throughout its entirety. The structure utilized was very effective, and you conveyed the information clearly. I also really appreciated your use of Bolsonaro’s quotes; some of them I had knowledge of, but the new ones added to my distaste. The one suggestion I would make would be to delve in a little deeper to the pushback on Bolsonaro; you mentioned civilian protests, but were there other sources of resistance? Other than that, this post was fantastic! I hope you finish the semester strong and have a relaxing break.
At the moment, it does certainly appear that Lula da Silva and his Workers Party are cruising towards victory in the 2022 Brazilian election. While removing Bolsonaro from the presidency of Brazil is a good first step towards improving democracy in Brazil, for many of the reasons you have listed above, it is essential that a victorious Lula da Silva forges a strong barrier against Bolsonaro or his allies gaining power in the future and further undermining Brazilian democracy. First, it is necessary to understand why Lula’s once-dominant Workers Party fell in the mid-2010s. According to Loureiro and Saad-Filho, the economic decline that marked the end of the Workers Party’s reign was caused by the inability of the Workers Party to adapt to a changing economic environment in Brazil (2018). When Lula and the Workers Party first became dominant in the early 2000s, they inherited a booming Brazilian economy, which allowed the Workers Party to implement subtle, pragmatic strategies to improve the Brazilian economy. However, after the Brazilian peaked around the mid-2000s, the value of Brazil’s exports collapsed, leading to a rapid economic decline (World Bank, 2021). Though aggressive economic reforms could have likely righted the Brazilian economy, the Workers Party refused to diverge from their established policy of mild pragmatism, leading to the rapidly declining popularity of the Workers Party in Brazil and their loss in the 2018 election against Bolsonaro. If Lula and his Workers Party wish to prevent the democratic erosion that happened under Bolsonaro from happening again, they need to take aggressive measures to improve Brazil’s floundering economy. In short, what Bolsonaro is doing now to undermine Brazilian democracy is less important than what the likely victorious Lula can do in the future to prevent a Bolsonaro-like situation from happening again.
Loureiro, P. M., & Saad-Filho, A. (2019). The limits of pragmatism: the rise and fall of the Brazilian Workers’ Party (2002–2016). Latin American Perspectives, 46(1), 66-84.
The World Bank (2021). Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) – Brazil. Retrieved from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.ZS?locations=BR.
Hello Aziz! I enjoyed reading your analysis of Bolsonaro’s subversion of the democratic order in Brazil. The patterns you’ve observed in his style of leadership, rhetoric and application of executive privileges are trends we have observed in several countries around the world. Particularly striking was his denial of election legitimacy, which is well regarded as a sign of fascist tendencies. I find this especially thought-provoking as it mirrors the antidemocratic behaviors exhibited very recently by the GOP. Equally compelling was your description of “paradoxical” implications associated with right-wing populism and democracy. Often, such leaders tap into a burgeoning repressive sentiment among their populace. To identify with these groups, figures such as Bolsanaro and Donald Trump express xenophobic, mysoginistic and homophobic attitudes; these statements often result in their intended consequences. This subset of culturally traditional, lesser educated and economically disadvantaged voters has the power to sabotage the democratic process in several countries. Many such nations are hegemonic and possess the capability to corrupt democracies elsewhere.
You go on to mention several other characteristics we have witnessed in Brazil and many other countries which display democratic regressions. One you’ve mentioned is polarization, which on its own appears rudimentary, but in reality carries crucial implications. Behavioral norms are essential to the democratic process despite the fact that, legally speaking, they do not exist. Mutual toleration, or a respect for one another’s right to be represented, is one of such norms which can be destroyed by divisiveness. The absence of it facilitates extra-democratic actions and a marginalization of traditionally oppressed groups. Lastly, you also cleverly noted how social media is a concerningly strong enabler of right-wing populism. Overall, I find your analysis and use of sources to be a compelling demonstration of the emergence, threat and implications of Bolsanaro’s rise to power in Brazil.