In the last decade, Turkey’s political system has been characterized by polarization, democratic backsliding, competitive authoritarianism, and populism (Moral, 2021). Although such drastic shifts can be attributable to the rising authoritarianism of AKP and Erdoğan, Turkey’s struggle to consolidate its democracy is a perpetual issue.

Turkey has a long history of democratization movements and multi-party elections since 1950 and broad support for traditional political engagement and democracy (Kalaycıoğlu 2001). However, state institutions are weak, and widespread corruption creates significant roadblocks to democratization, resulting in an unconsolidated democracy.

This post focuses on the post-2002 era and explains how Turkey has shifted from a tutelary democracy to a competitive authoritarian regime. In 2002, the AKP won 34% of the votes, giving them a majority in Parliament. At the time, Turkey was a tutelary democracy where the military and judiciary had veto power over elected officials. The AKP party has reduced the military’s political influence by allowing elected officials more control and decreasing the power of veto players (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016).

The AKP has pushed the military further since the E-memorandum in 2007, leading to hundreds of high-ranking military personnel being brought to court in the ‘Ergenekon’ and ‘Sledgehammer’ cases due to alleged conspiracies against the AKP. This has drastically changed civil-military relations in Turkey, reducing the military’s influence in politics (Aydın-Düzgit, 2012).

Although operations to the military weakened rule of law, at the same time, AKP has made efforts to democratize the country, making progress for Islamic and Kurdish citizens who have been excluded since the early Republic period. The end of tutelary democracy in Turkey did not bring about democratic consolidation, but rather the elected AKP government adopted an authoritarian stance. With the support of a diverse range of urban and rural areas, the AKP seized control of political institutions and used state resources to suppress the opposition and ensure their re-election (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016).

Bermeo (2016) argues that traditional forms of democratic backsliding, i.e., classic military coups, executive coups, and election day vote fraud, have been declining. On the other hand, more subtle forms of backsliding, i.e., promissory coups, executive aggrandizement, and strategical electoral manipulation, have become more prevalent. There are new challenges for democracy, such as “the kinds of concrete actions transform a regime from one type to another.” In this line, Turkey is a textbook example of a new form of democratic backsliding. According to Levitsky and Way (2010), Turkey is a competitive authoritarian regime, as it meets the criteria of unfair elections, violation of civil liberties, and an uneven playing field.

If we look at unfair elections, first, in 2010, the Supreme Election Council (YSK) was changed to give the government more influence. In 2014, there were a lot of allegations of election fraud, especially in places closely contested where the AKP won. Moreover, after the November 2015 elections, Oy ve Otesi reported some mismatch between its count and election outcomes. In terms of campaigning, the AKP enjoyed great state resources. Lastly, opposition figures were attacked. Especially many HDP members are still in jail (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016).
The new Internet Law has given the government more control over the internet, leading to media censorship, attacks on journalists, and lawsuits against citizens for their tweets. Most alarmingly, the government violently suppressed peaceful protests (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016).

The government has used state resources for its own campaign purposes, creating an uneven playing field for the opposition. For example, the state channel TRT showed the AKP party for half the time before the 2018 elections. Opposition media outlets were also attacked (Esen & Gumuscu, 2016).

Is there hope for Turkish democracy? I’ll say yes. First, candidates from two-party blocs ran in the 2019 local elections. Despite not being a formal member of the Millet Ittifaki, the HDP supported this alliance by not nominating a candidate in several major cities. This election demonstrates that the opposition parties have gained power. More importantly, the AKP was defeated in İstanbul and Ankara. It is important to note that conservative parties have long governed Istanbul and Ankara, namely the AK Party’s predecessor Refah Partisi (Welfare Party, RP), since 1994 and the AK Party since the 2004 local elections.

The democracy-authoritarianism cleavage emerged as a result of the process of democratic backsliding, and this cleavage gradually became more prominent in the party system than the historically rooted secular-religious conservative and Turkish-Kurdish social cleavages (Selçuk & Hekimci, 2020). This explains why opposition parties from various ideological backgrounds have been able to coordinate. I believe the table of six can be a small step towards democratic consolidation if it achieves to emphasize democracy-authoritarianism cleavage.

Aydın-Düzgit, S. (2012). No crisis, no change: the third AKP victory in the June 2011 parliamentary elections in Turkey. South European Society and Politics, 17(2), 329-346.
Bermeo, N. (2016). On democratic backsliding. Journal of Democracy, 27(1), 5–19.
Esen, B., & Gumuscu, S. (2016). Rising competitive authoritarianism in Turkey. Third World Quarterly, 37(9), 1581-1606.
Kalaycioğlu, E. (2001). Turkish democracy: Patronage versus governance. Turkish Studies, 2(1), 54-70.
Levitsky, S., & Way, L. A. (2010). Competitive authoritarianism: Hybrid regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge University Press.
Moral, M. (2021). Politics as (un) usual?: An overview of the June 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey. Elections and Public Opinion in Turkey, 22-47.
Selçuk, O., & Hekimci, D. (2020). The rise of the democracy–authoritarianism cleavage and opposition coordination in Turkey (2014–2019). Democratization, 27(8), 1496-1514.