Recently, the rise of democratic regimes that began after the 1970s or the Third Wave of Democratization has stopped. This wave was then replaced by a rise in autocratic regimes throughout the World. There have been numerous examples of former democracies turning into autocracies. One of these cases is the one in Turkey which began with the AKP rule. AKP or the Justice and Development Party came to power in 2002 by winning the general elections and they have been in power ever since. They first emerged as the advocate of small and family-owned businesses in Anatolia but gained popularity quite quickly especially from the support of the urban poor and the collapse of the center right really opened up their way to become this hegemonic party that they are now.
During their first term, there haven’t been any major democratic erosion or backsliding that was noticed. This was due to their efforts on fixing the 2001 Economic Crisis and their somewhat positive relations with the West. There have been talks with European Union, economy was turning back to normal and the regime was stable. They were aiding the poor, creating foundations and charities to distribute various resources and money to various parts of Turkey so their supporters were relatively happy. However, things took a massive turn after the beginning of AKP’s second term in 2007, followed up with 2011 and 2013 in particular. This blog will go over the events that started after 2007 which led to unprecedented levels of democratic erosion and backsliding within Turkey, turning the regime into competitive authoritarian.
After dealing with the economic crisis and increasing their support even more, it was time for AKP to consolidate its rule. They followed 6 steps to become the undisputed hegemonic power of Turkey while significantly damaging its democratic system and institutions. The first step was winning the parliamentary majority, which they did in 2002. Come 2007, they wanted more consolidation so they picked Abdullah Gül, who is a prominent member of AKP, to become the new president of Turkey. This event was massively boycotted by many, especially the military. As a response, the military wrote an e-memorandum and released it for everyone to see, saying that Gül becoming president wouldn’t be approved by them and it is against the secular ways of Turkey. AKP responded by going to elections and winning, so the people chose Abdullah Gül as their new president.
Now that the presidency was in their hands, it was time to suppress the military who threatened them with the e-memorandum. Even though it is not proven, it is also said that the military was planning a coup to overthrow the AKP rule. This alleged coup plan and the e-memorandum were important threats for the AKP leaders so they began to purge important military figures after the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials. There have been countless arrests within various ranks of the military so key military positions were now open for replacement. What AKP did was, they replaced these military officers with members of the Gülen movement. The Gülen movement was led by a popular religious leader called Fetullah Gülen who was the former ally of AKP rulers. The Gülenists took over many important military positions so now the military threat was gone as well.
Now, AKP took its eyes on the media. There have been many criticisms towards their rule especially from the opposition media. So, the AKP began purchasing various important media groups like ATV and Sabah, then selling these companies to their allies for increased support and reduced criticism. They also began a massive media censorship resulting in many newspapers and TV channels to not be able to publish and opposition related news. This was a big hit towards the democratic regime since free media and civil liberty rights are some of the most essential factors of a liberal democracy.
One other important step towards consolidation for AKP was to take over the Constitutional Court. After the 2010 referendum, AKP’s demands were approved when the majority of the people said yes to the changes. Prior to the referendum, 3/5 of the majority were needed to change the constitution or close down political parties. However, after the referendum AKP turned it into 2/3 of the majority, which was again a big hit on the levels of democracy.
It is also worth mentioning the suppression of various civil protests, especially the infamous Gezi Protests of 2013. The Gezi Protest had unprecedented levels of resistance by the people of Turkey. It started in Istanbul but spread throughout the country with the use of social media. The government was forced to use very high levels of suppression with the police forces which resulted in countless injuries and even several deaths of the protestors.
All of these resulted in the fall of democracy and the rise of autocracy in Turkey. It was a near flawless process for the AKP to take over every important institution and fully consolidate its authoritarian rule while keeping its high levels of support. There is however, a very important figure who I haven’t mentioned yet. This figure is none other than Recep Tayyip Erdoğan who is the most important actor on all the events that have happened since 2002.
Erdoğan, as a right-wing populist, followed a political course similar to other authoritarian leaders like Orban, Chavez and Vucic. He was always a fan favorite with his personality and effective speeches. These past few years have showed that former AKP supporters had enough of AKP but they may still have positive thoughts towards Erdoğan because they see him as somewhat of a savior who brought them wealth and goods. Now wealthy and satisfied, these people began to feel dislike and hatred towards the opposition and its supporters. This then resulted in high levels of polarization within the society. He also managed to create an uneven playing field, making it easier for him to win elections. Later on, he fully captured the control of AKP even after becoming the president of Turkey. He teamed up with the former opposition party, MHP and created the super-presidential system, giving him increased levels of power. It wouldn’t be right to pinpoint a certain event that caused the democratic breakdown of Turkey but one could argue that this was the final nail in the coffin. As Berk Esen and Şebnem Gümüşçü explain in their article, Turkey is unfortunately not a democracy anymore. (Gümüşçü and Esen, 2021). Generally speaking, all of these events that are mentioned above resulted in the collapse of democracy in Turkey, replacing it with a competitive autocracy.
REFERENCES
Esen, B., & Gumuscu, S. (2021). Why did Turkish democracy collapse? A political economy account of AKP’s authoritarianism. Party Politics, 27(6), 1075-1091.
Erem Bilgesu from Sabanci University crafted an intriguing post about Turkey’s democratic collapse. Their claim that Turkey is no longer a democracy and is now a competitive autocracy is well supported by the evidence of the rise of the AKP rule. The AKP, also known as the Justice and Development Party, came to power slowly, as it began as a small and family-owned business. At first, the democratic backsliding was unidentified, but it was during their second term in 2007 that the democratic erosion became apparent. This involved AKP following six steps, such as winning the parliamentary majority and suppressing the military who threatened them. The writer concluded that these events led to the fall of democracy and the rise of autocracy, and that when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became president, that fully secured the switch. I agree with these points, as this clearly led to the collapse of democracy in Turkey. It is unfortunate that this happened and that it was not recognized sooner. However, as noted in this text, and by Nancy Bermeo (2016), democratic backsliding can be difficult to identify, as it can occur slowly. The rise of AKP was a gradual and downhill journey that destroyed Turkey’s democratic governance. Furthermore, there are some aspects of Turkey’s collapse that were not particularly mentioned or that could be expanded upon. Specifically, these include the relationship between populism and the actions made by AKP, early warning signs of democratic backsliding, and Turkey’s government practices currently, along with the level of tension in the country.
AKP clearly exemplified traits of populism. Specifically, when Gül was president, they engaged in practices to consolidate their authoritarian rule and weakened civil liberties by restricting media access. Since Gül was already the prime minister before, gaining presidential powers allowed him to control other branches of government. Adding on, Frances Lee (2019) notes that once a populist is in power, they tend to degrade democracy by weakening civil liberties, the fairness of the electoral process, and the rule of law. The text effectively explains how the rule of law and civil liberties were weakened, however, there could be more discussion on the extent to which the fairness of the electoral process was changed during this period. Moreover, populists typically come to power through democratic processes, but it is their manipulation of electoral practices and democratic institutions that allows for this. Similar to above, the inclusion of how AKP manipulated electoral processes to stay in power could be incorporated, especially since it is explained how the military and others boycotted Gül being AKP’s candidate, as this may seem contradictory to the high levels of support they received. Furthermore, Jan-Werner Müller (2016) states that there are three traits of populist governance which include hijacking the state’s structure, widespread corruption and clientelism, and systematic citizen repression. This is similar to what AKP did, as they took advantage of their position in power with Gül and manipulated the democratic institutions, exploited corruption by implementing huge media censorship, and suppressed civil protests and the military.
The early warning signs of democratic backsliding are crucial to identify, thus I recommend extending the discussion of the spotting of these signs. Although I recognize that there were not any major signs of democratic erosion noticed during AKP’s first term, I question whether there were concerning events happening simultaneously that were more hidden from citizens. Bilgesu notes that during AKP’s first term of leadership, they were making an effort to return Turkey’s state to being stable and amend the economic crisis of 2001. Were these actions genuine or could they have been potentially part of a plan to avoid any noticeability of warning signs? As Ziblatt and Levitsky (2018) state, authoritarians must be identified first in order to be kept out. Warning signs could include denying democratic rules, rejecting the legitimacy of their opponents, or tolerating and encouraging violence. If these warning factors were detected sooner, could this have led to the prevention of this democratic collapse? Eventually, AKP exemplifies some of these signs, such as the suppression of police forces that resulted in injuries and deaths, but it is not until their second term that it becomes noticeable. Moreover, the writer could add if warning signs were seen before they came into power at all, specifically when they were just a small family-owned business. It would be interesting to see if others who originally worked with them observed any populist characteristics portrayed by AKP.
One last aspect Bilgesu could have expanded more on is Turkey’s government practices currently, and the level of tension associated with it. Particularly, explaining how the government system’s practices have changed due to this form of ruling, and the citizen’s reaction to it, could provide more context to the situation overall. It is briefly stated that Turkey is now faced with a competitive autocracy, along with some aspects that occurred during Erdoğan’s ruling. With this knowledge, the writer could add the extent to which civil liberties are being violated currently and how biased the electoral process is in terms of reelecting the present ruler. Moreover, there could be more included about the level of tension in Turkey. Knowing the current situation, one could assume that there would likely be great tension between this form of governance and the citizens. It would be interesting to observe the difference in levels before this collapse and now. Conclusively, this was a very well-written post and it was an intriguing read. There were only some additional pieces of information that could be added to the argument, yet I agree with all the points made about Turkey’s democratic collapse.
References:
Daniel Ziblatt and Steven Levitsky (2018), How Democracies Die
Frances Lee (2019), Populism and the American Party System: Opportunities and Constraints
Jan-Werner Müller (2016), What is Populism
Nancy Bermeo (2016), On Democratic Backsliding