Time and votes simultaneously unveiled themselves in the recent July 2023 elections as Spain looked on a highway to a political block. With traditional socialist PSOE unwilling to reach agreements with its conservative counterpart, PP, support from separatists seems like the only viable way. PSOE lost the elections but seems like the only party in a position to form a government. The question is: What is the price to pay for a majority? And can Spanish democracy pay for it?

Flashback to the 1st of October 2017-Amidst a climate of crisis and conflict, the Catalonian government carries out a referendum for independence without the central government’s approval. After multiple attempts to appease the situation, President Rajoy applies Article 155, a forced destitution of the regional government, and legal prosecution against the movement’s leaders begins.

After a corruption scandal led to a successful vote of no confidence against Rajoy, Spain entered years of political block with different failures to form a majority government. This came to an end when Sánchez secured a narrow win by two votes in January 2020. What got him into power? Key abstentions by Catalonian separatists ERC.

Withal, negotiations for said government formation required more than policy-making and ideological discussions. Sánchez made promises that have long impacted Spanish democracy. For instance, around 40% of extra funding allocated to regional governments has been given to Catalunya, which only possesses 19% of the country’s GDP. Crispation has arisen in other regions as the nature of the investment is questioned: Is Sánchez paying back for electoral favors at the expense of the country’s development?

Regardless, what is clear is that Sánchez’s prime minister bid in the Congress of Deputies was a mirror image of the rest of his government, as PSOE found itself needing separatist support for every intended move. Concessions regarding decentralization and an increase in autonomy followed themselves as separatist parties gave constant reminders that receiving constitutional support for their referendum was the desired end-product of all negotiations.

Fast forward back to July 2023-Conservative candidate Feijóo wins the election but seems unlikely to form a government. The only alternative, other than a political block, is Sánchez finding enough partners to reach the majority. The deal, however, is more complicated this time, as he would need support from all separatist parties, two Basque and two Catalonian, to reach the magic number (176 seats in the Congress of Deputies).

Junts per Catalunya, led by exiled Carles Puidgemont, has already stated a “binding referendum” is their requirement and ERC is looking to join them in their pursuits. Therefore, with separatist parties not only fully integrated into but also becoming key players in Spanish democracy, do they pose a threat?

Before we answer said question, however, another key theoretical point must be addressed. Is national unity a democratic foundational value? If so, all separatist parties must be deemed undemocratic and, consequently, a threat. Nonetheless, it is common for scholars, such as Will Kymlicka, to argue that allowing for secessionism to be discussed is part of spreading equal civil rights amongst citizens. Ensuring minorities are not imprisoned within a state that discriminates against them by giving them the chance to leave will, in turn, shape the state in a way that respects them.

Following the same line of thought, one could find support in scholars like Dahl and conclude that the current role of separatist parties in the Spanish Congress is nothing more than the result of positive pluralism and a well-designed representation system that allows for the voice of minorities to be heard. This argument, whilst generally accurate, gains a new dimension when juxtaposed with Seymour Martin’s work. He goes further and discusses that a mix of multi-party systems, pluralism, and proportional representation; all of which accurately describe the Spanish congress’ electoral system, strengthens democracy as long as institutions are held strong. In such cases, the worst possible scenario is one in which an irresponsible minority with interests contrary to those of the nation, gains a little too much power. However, if the opposite happens, Martin warns of possible threats to the democratic system’s survival.

Following his work, the reasons for such pessimistic predictions might remain unclear, but they awkwardly become clarified by the Spanish example. In Spain, institutions as big as the Constitutional Court, have already been challenged by the same minority parties that now hold political power. The independence referendum is only the most obvious example, but with it come many others, such as the multiple misinformation campaigns. Recent accusations have gone as deep as narrating tilted versions of Spanish history in textbooks or spreading the concept that Catalunya is the victim of an autocratic regime. Despite now looking for somewhat democratic methods to obtain their goals, one must ask one’s self whether more unconstitutional action follows once they are given a bit of leeway. Can these parties even be trusted to act constitutionally?

At this point, it is important to highlight the damage Spanish democracy has already suffered. Constitutions and institutions such as the Constitutional Court are walls that protect a state’s democracy and lie at the base of its democratic foundations. The undermining of their power is, therefore, a direct symptom of erosion. 

The problem further aggravates if the available measure to defend the constitution erodes democracy as well. Article 155, whilst a common weapon to defend national integrity amongst European Union Member States, cannot really be classified as democratic. When put in place, the democratically elected government ceases to have any competence, and control over the region is handed to the central government. It is quite obviously an authoritarian move that directly opposes the central idea of citizens choosing who is in power.

Another cause for concern can be found in the increasing importance of Catalan and Basque issues at a national scale due to the political relevance of the regions. Theoretically, an elected party should follow its program and accurately represent its voters, doing what the people have voted them into government to do. However, with the almost do-or-die urgency to satisfy separatists’ wishes caused by the congress’ context, the needs of the actual majority could be unprioritized or even overlooked. 

Therefore, Spanish democracy finds itself at a crossroads. The political block is clearly undesirable, but Sánchez forming a secessionist-powered coalition might bring even worse consequences. It is clear that if separatist parties choose, at any point, the unconstitutional path to pursue their goals, democracy will be eroded. Nonetheless, what really is worrying is that even if they do not, democracy will also face severe challenges. The sheer fact of such parties playing such an important role in parliament will give added importance to their particular issues, something which already does not align with traditional, majority-oriented concepts of democracy. Furthermore, if autonomy concessions continue to be the norm, independence will be closer than ever, putting Spanish integrity at risk and certainly triggering all sorts of responses around the country.

With this, it becomes clear that while not conceptually undemocratic, the nature of Spanish separatism causes it to be a challenge to its democracy. With negotiations tightening and more concessions visibly on the horizon, two final questions rise above all: How much more power can separatist parties gain? And will the damage prove irreparable?  It’s the irony of choosing the future of a nation you do not wish to be part of. Of governing a country you do not want to exist.