In the world of authoritarian regimes, the longevity of autocratic leaders often hinges on the institutions they establish and control. Myanmar has been a prime example of this dynamic, how institutional arrangements play a pivotal role in sustaining the rule of the military junta led by General Min Aung Hlaing. This article delves into the mechanics of institutional design in Myanmar, revealing how these arrangements have propelled the junta’s grip on power in Myanmar, drawing insights from Jennifer Ghandi and Adam Przeworski’s seminal paper “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats.”
The Authoritarian Typology of Myanmar
Ghandi and Przeworski’s framework, as outlined in their paper, categorizes authoritarian regimes into distinct types. With its powerful military junta, Myanmar fits squarely within the “military junta” category. The military, also known as the Tatmadaw, has long held a dominant role in the country’s political landscape, exerting control over key institutions, including the executive, legislative, and judiciary. The story of Myanmar’s military junta dates back to 1962 when General Ne Win led a coup, ushering in decades of authoritarian rule. While the country ostensibly transitioned to a quasi-civilian government in 2011, the military’s institutional influence endured (Turnell, 2011). In recent times, the 2021 coup d’état led by General Min Aung Hlaing in Myanmar occurred on February 1, 2021, involving a political maneuver that led to the transfer of power from a democratically elected government to the military (McKenna, 2023).
The Military as the Dominant Institution Power and Control
One of the key institutional arrangements sustaining the junta is the military’s preeminent role in Myanmar’s governance. The Tatmadaw’s grip extends far beyond defense and security; it permeates the highest levels of government. Notably, the 2008 constitution, drafted by the military, reserves key positions for military personnel. Key positions in the government, including the presidency, are constitutionally reserved for military personnel. Foremost among these is Article 436, which grants the military a quarter of the seats in both the national parliament’s upper and lower chambers and a third of the seats in the state and regional parliaments. Furthermore, due to the requirement that constitutional amendments secure more than a 75 percent majority in the parliament, the military’s prescribed 25 percent representation provides it with substantial influence to effectively block any proposed modifications (Nehru, 2015). This arrangement gives the military a significant say in the nation’s political affairs. Moreover, the military’s grip extends to the economy, with many enterprises controlled by military-affiliated unions.
Control of Key Institutions
In Myanmar, institutional control extends well beyond the halls of government. The junta has established influence over key institutions, including the ministers of defense, home affairs, border affairs, foreign affairs, the police, intelligence services, and state-owned enterprises. Certainly, military personnel, both those currently serving and those who have retired, hold the majority of the high-ranking roles within government ministries, state-owned enterprises, and crucial public bodies, including entities like the Myanmar Investment Commission and the Union Election Commission (Nehru, 2015). This control facilitates the regime’s suppression of dissent and reinforces its authority.
Survival Strategies
As outlined in Przeworski’s paper, the institutional design profoundly influences the survival strategies employed by autocrats. In Myanmar, Min Aung Hlaing and the Tatmadaw have implemented various strategies to maintain their hold on power.
Loyalty of Elites: The military regime has maintained the loyalty of top military officials, ensuring that potential dissent or coup attempts are swiftly quashed. This tight control over the military has prevented any internal challenges to the regime’s authority. Throughout more than sixty years, Myanmar’s military has held sway, nurturing a deeply entrenched system characterized by militarization. This setting has created significant openings for individuals referred to as “cronies” who align with the military, constructing a system built on favoritism and nepotism within the military’s governing framework (ChinDwin, 2021).
Suppression of Oppositions: The regime has consistently employed harsh measures to suppress opposition, including the violent suppression of pro-democracy protests and the imprisonment of political rebels. The military’s control over law enforcement and the judiciary has facilitated these repressive tactics. Since February 1, 2021, the Myanmar junta has carried out extensive mass arrests, arbitrary detentions, and summary trials that do not adhere to international standards. Among those wrongfully convicted are a diverse group of individuals, including demonstrators, journalists, human rights activists, and members of the ousted National League for Democracy (NLD) party. To expedite politically sensitive cases, the junta has introduced “special courts” within prison facilities, diverting these cases away from standard criminal courts. These special courts impose significant restrictions on lawyers, including limitations on private client communications prior to hearings. Lawyers have reported that junta officials frequently obstruct or impede their professional duties, thereby depriving suspects of their right to due process and a fair trial (Maung, 2023).
Power-Sharing Arrangements: Myanmar’s constitution, drafted by the military, includes power-sharing arrangements that allow the Tatmadaw to retain substantial influence, even as Myanmar nominally transitioned to a civilian government in 2011. This has given the military significant leverage in key decisions and policies. The 2008 Constitution of Myanmar introduced a power-sharing arrangement between civilian authorities and the military, granting the military significant influence over crucial policy domains and bestowing upon them the authority to veto constitutional amendments. This constitution established a unique framework for the military, entitling them to special privileges, legal safeguards, and representation in state institutions, including the legislative and executive branches. In contrast to the customary practice in many nations, where the head of the executive typically holds the role of commander-in-chief of the armed forces, in Myanmar, the President did not assume this position. Instead, the military retained the role of Commander-in-Chief, enabling them to assume control during national crises that threatened unity. Additionally, the National Defense and Security Council, where the military held a predominant presence, played a pivotal role in shaping policy and overseeing executive functions(International Idea, 2022).
The most obvious is Myanmar’s 2021 coup which provides a real-world example of how institutional arrangements shaped the survival of Min Aung Hlaing’s regime. The coup showcased how the military’s institutional power and control enabled it to easily subvert the democratic transition. The regime’s survival has hinged on its ability to employ institutional arrangements that keep power concentrated within the military’s sphere of influence. Despite widespread domestic protests and international condemnation, the military’s institutional control has allowed Min Aung Hlaing to maintain a tenuous hold on power.
Through the lens of Jennifer Ghandi and Adam Przeworski’s paper, we can see how the institutional arrangements within authoritarian regimes, such as Myanmar’s military junta, significantly contribute to the survival of autocratic leaders like Min Aung Hlaing. The regime’s dominance over key institutions, combined with its survival strategies, has allowed it to weather domestic and international challenges, solidifying its rule. Understanding the dynamics of these institutional arrangements is vital for comprehending the junta’s resilience and the enduring influence of the Tatmadaw in Myanmar’s political arena. The end of the coup extends beyond the removal of General Min Aung Hlaing from power. The comprehensive remedy necessitates the demolition of the entire military institution, which exerts deep-seated influence throughout the fabric of our society.
Reference
ChinDwin. (2021, October 11). Unmasking a new face of Myanmar military’s crony.
International Idea. (2022, September). Constitutional profile Myanmar. Constitution https://constitutionnet.org/country/myanmar
Jennifer Ghandi and Adam Przeworski. (2007). “Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats”, Comparative Political Studies 40 (11): 1279-1301.
Maung, M. (2023, June 8). “Our numbers are dwindling.” Human Rights Watch. https://www.hrw.org/report/2023/06/08/our-numbers-are-dwindling/myanmars-post-coup-crackdown-lawyers
McKenna, A. (2023, October 10). 2021 Myanmar coup d’état. Encyclopedia Britannica. https://www.britannica.com/event/2021-Myanmar-coup-d-etat
Nehru, V. (2015, June 2). Myanmar’s military keeps firm grip on Democratic transition.
Turnell, S. (2011). Myanmar’s Fifty-Year Authoritarian Trap. Journal of International Affairs, 65(1), 79-92. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24388183
I totally agree with the analysis that you described in this post, it is a well-researched and intensive perceptive evaluation of how institutional design supports Myanmar’s authoritarian rule is impressive. As for me, sometimes the concept or theory is hard to understand, but your blog post has applied the comparison of the processes at work in Myanmar with the ideas put out by Jennifer Ghandi and Adam Przeworski offering an engaging examination of the ways in which autocrats hold onto power is easy to understand. You also described clearly that the “military junta,” that Myanmar’s situation fits with the authoritarian framework of Ghandi and Przeworski, demonstrating the military’s continued control over the political system in the nation. The 2008 constitution’s design, which gives military personnel significant power and reserves important posts for them by requiring a 75 percent majority for constitutional modifications, reflects the scope of the military’s institutional authority.
Moreover, this part of the review is a great part too. I like the way you brought up and well evaluation that your focus on the strategies used by Min Aung Hlaing’s regime that he tried to hold onto power, such as elite loyalty, opposition suppression, and power-sharing agreements. The regime’s ability to keep military personnel loyal and eliminate criticism, together in order with the power-sharing agreements that have given the military significant sway, show how these institutional frameworks have aided in the regime’s longevity. This is a real-life example of how these institutional structures influence the longevity of authoritarian dictators the coup in Myanmar in 2021. The Tatmadaw’s tenacity and influence are shown by Min Aung Hlaing’s ability to hold onto power through institutional control of the military, in spite of both international criticism and opposition from the local population.
Your thorough research offers an in-depth understanding of Myanmar’s authoritarian government and its institutional foundations since it is based on both theory and real-life events. Your perspective completes with a powerful and interesting request for an extensive solution that goes beyond the removal of a single person to address the pervasive impact caused by the military institution.
In fact, there is no denying that the 2008 Constitution and the institutions of the military have supported General Min Aung Hlaing to remain in power. However, General Min Aung Hlaing himself, trying to shape the institutions as his personal interests. There is also the view that he is shaping the executive institutionls, judicial institutions and legislative institutions himself. For example, there is a provision that the president appoints the position of Commender in Chief(CinC)of Defense after consulting with the opinion of the National Defense and Security Council. Since the council meeting was not called during the NLD government, the current CinC of defence, Min Aung Hlaing, has challenged his position. It also raised concerns within the military. Therefore, after the 2021 coup d’état, he himself extended his term and period as Commander in Chief of Defense. If you look at these, you can see that it is not the institutions of the military that are working to prolong the life of the Chief of Defense, but he himself is doing it systematically. This article does not have that view.
Thank you so much for this insightful analysis. I agree with your analysis. I would like to share how the military is losing control of the economy despite the institutional arrangement they designed. Since 1988, the military and its affiliated establishments have enjoyed unchecked control over Myanmar’s economy – through their control of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the military’s economic establishment, Myanmar Economic Holding Limited – until 2015. During the five years of civilian administration, military-economic control was cut short, and SOEs were reformed to meet the changing political landscape and placed under civilian control. The business environment was liberalized through different reforms supported by the World Bank Group and the Asian Development Bank. Even though the military still enjoyed economic privileges under the NayPyiTaw consensus, these led to grievances among military elites. Their unchecked wealth and economic privileges came under scrutiny from the public and civil society organizations. As the market was liberalized, nepotism and favoritism were ceased. These factors, combined with their power and authority being stripped by the civilian government, led to orchestrating the coup citing electoral fraud. Although institutional arrangements under the 2008 Constitution are drafted by the military itself, the military is facing the challenges of controlling the economy and economic activities of people due to the economic defiance of public and economic reforms conducted by the civilian government. Apart from that, the regime is struggling to justify its continued state of emergency status beyond the constitutional limit of 2 years. Thanks again for your analysis.
This is the first time I’m hearing of a government having key positions reserved specifically for military personnel. I can’t believe even the presidency is reserved for military officials. This is an evident display of authoritarian power-grabbing. I was also surprised by the government giving the military 25 percent of the parliament’s representation, the amount needed for them to block amendments. I am curious as to how this affects the interaction and relations these military representatives have with the other non-military 75 percent. How long does it take for a bill or legislation to pass in the parliament on average? Of course, there is bound to be some tension between the military representatives and the non-military representatives, but are they constantly in a gridlock or are the non-military representatives strategic about the legislation they introduce?
After reading that the military oversees Myanmar’s foreign affairs I was interested to learn more and looked into their foreign policy. I was incredibly surprised to read that the ministry of foreign affairs aims to have friendly relations with countries that support ending dictatorship and restoring “full-fledged democracy”. It’s odd that so many authoritarian or authoritarian-leaning governments insist on claiming they do care and want a democracy but do the exact opposite. This is most likely to save face in front of international outcry and to not lose the support of their citizens.
You mention that the remedy for Myanmar’s military junta will require the demolition of the entire military institution, but I’m not sure what this could look like without hurting the country and its institutions. It seems like the military is embedded deeply into almost every aspect of Myanmar’s government, so any attempt to topple this military relation will inadvertently weaken all of these institutions and require them to be rebuilt from the ground up.