Most scholars who follow American democratic erosion begin with social polarization and attempt to find some sociological argument for it. Some thinkers, such as Kathy Cramer, argue that polarization is forming along regional lines, while others like Arlie Hochschild claim that increasing polarization begins with racial and other social divides. Regardless of where polarization originates, most scholars argue that polarized voters will vote against their own interests, as they convince themselves that their true enemies are other social identities. It is these polarized voters who become the supporters of far-right radical politicians who proceed to truly threaten the stability of American democracy.

I believe that, regardless of which sociological justification for polarization is used, this modern model of polarization does not place blame where it belongs: On a social elite that have knowingly curated polarization and discontent. By asserting that polarization is a result of social forces and that it is a precursor to xenophobic populism, this model frames populism as an inevitable result of democracy. By accepting that, we have already let the polarizers and the populists win by playing on their turf. Instead, we must understand xenophobic populism as a disease crafted to make democracy and inequality consistent, and we must recognize the socioeconomic elite as its creators.

Kathy Cramer’s book The Politics of Resentment attempts to explain where polarization comes from. Cramer argues for what she calls a “rural consciousness” among rural Americans who believe that the social, economic, and political elites are working to benefit urbanites and harm rural interests. This leads those rural citizens to believe that the system’s urban leadership is fundamentally unjust towards them and their particular social identities. Cramer argues that this rising resentment aims its wrath not at the elite but at the elite’s proxy, namely urban citizens of all levels, and thus ultimately aims to attack the urban citizen’s interests. Thus, these voters view the success of those who aren’t like them as the primary threat to their well-being.

Arlie Hochschild presents a view of right-wing polarization that differs in its causal mechanisms from Cramer’s analysis, but produces the same body of radicalized voters divided by identity. Hochschild argues that social identity groups play a leading role in understanding how voters see the world. As formerly disadvantaged groups are promoted to full participation in American civil and political rights, the formerly-advantaged and now-radicalized voters believe that this “promotion” isn’t earned. Instead, it is the government who has intervened, helping other identity groups effectively cut the line of success. Thus, these voters view the success of those who aren’t like them as the primary threat to their well-being.

These analyses help us understand the psychology and circumstances of voters who have become dissociated from democracy. Both of them also help explain why polarized voters consistently vote against their best interest. However, I believe that both Cramer and Hochschild fail to consider that it is not polarization that forms a base for anti-democratic elites, but instead that anti-democratic elites work to forge polarization. Other nations have shown us similar patterns of leaders driving polarization: Javier Corrales has an excellent study on how the Chavez regime in Venezuela exploited political polarization to ensure its success in a broadly populist manner. If elites drive polarization abroad, the same patterns likely hold in America.

We must now explain why the elite would create polarization and why we must recognize that the elite have done so. The first question is baked into the tension between democracy’s claims of equality and realities of economic and social inequality. Democracy relies upon equality between citizens in decision-making, but typical patterns of economic and social inequality place most power into the hands of a small minority of the population, with the top 10% of households in America possessing two-thirds of the nation’s wealth. There are two ways to solve this tension. Either the government engages in redistribution to balance social and economic power or democracy becomes imperfect and associates political power with economic and social power. The United States has broadly done the latter, and this provides elites with incentives to maintain and legitimize their influence through democratic means and by restricting support for redistribution.

Combating popular support for redistribution comes in numerous forms, but is best done by directing the populace against itself. A divided populace will be more focused on combating itself than on combating the elite and balancing social and economic power. Polarization, particularly along non-class lines, can create these divides, and will be even more effective when promoted towards people who are already suffering and searching for something to blame. This means that, once crafted by elites, xenophobic polarization becomes a self-creating monster. Citizens hoping to fight in their own interest achieve nothing except worsening their lives, thus becoming angrier and more polarized as they believe their imagined enemies to have won. Thus, the great machine of xenophobic populism was born in America. Today, we see that the monster has truly lost its chains. Not only have Americans grown more aggressive towards those of the opposing party, their political leaders have grown less willing to cooperate with the other party. The political elite have begun to change their own patterns of voting to keep pace with their increasingly polarized electoral support.

If we want to protect American democracy from xenophobic populism, we must first understand that xenophobic populism is not and has never been a natural phenomenon of democracy. Accepting it as a natural democratic byproduct leads democracy’s defenders to view those voters as, in the now-famous words of Hillary Clinton, a “basket of deplorables.” Both Cramer and Hochschild endorse a similar worldview, effectively asserting that polarization originates in people who put their identities over democracy. It’s easy to assume that those identity-motivated voters can’t be trusted to endorse the ideals of democracy.

This very assumption is where democracy’s defenders fail. By asserting that certain voter blocs cannot be trusted with democracy, we abandon the very democratic ideals that we claim to defend. By splitting voters into accountable and polarized camps, we end up accepting the very us-against-them structures that polarization is founded in and that xenophobic populism feeds on. 

To save democracy, we must focus on the elites that use xenophobic populism as a defense mechanism and who promote division to preserve themselves. Defeating those elites, not merely at the ballot box (though certainly at the ballot box!) but also in the cultural landscape, will be the most effective means to preserve American democracy. We cannot save democracy by allowing its enemies’ main strategy to dominate the paradigm. Instead, we must move towards a more just socioeconomic system that will, to the horror of some of democracy’s advocates, work to the benefit of those who have been polarized against democracy. Only by accepting and working to benefit the polarized voter can we defeat the elite that have worked to polarize them.