No other comparison on Philippine politicians is as aesthetically pleasing as being called “butterflies”. This is not to say they are graceful or resilient, but rather that they switch parties as easily and as frequently as butterflies that flit from flower to flower.

Few may argue that political butterflies, just like the actual ones, are nearly harmless. However, political turncoatism (another term for the presence of political butterflies) has adverse impacts on democratic consolidation, or the persistence of democratic institutions over time (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 30). With butterflies fluttering freely, democratic consolidation is hampered.

Gardening in sand

Political parties can be dissolved, merged, split, resurrected, renamed, or completely flushed down the toilet any time. Both now and before the Philippine Commonwealth period of the 1930’s to 1946, parties are criticized as candidate-centered, patronage-based, and office-seeking coalitions, lacking concrete ideological and programmatic underpinnings (Teehankee 2018). Some of these groups do not reflect any social cleavages, have identical platforms, and even during the Commonwealth period, party-switching was fluid (Ufen 2008, 5). The political elite control these unstable political parties as their electoral machinery.

Philippine political butterflies are rampant due to the lack of value infusion and behavioral routinization in the political party system, seen when politicians view parties only as expendable tools, showing scant commitment to the party’s objectives, and the absence of stable patterns of organization, with wavering wills against charismatic or powerful individuals (Levitsky 1998). This has resulted in bandwagoning, political turncoatism, and dearth of ideological or programmatic roots, rendering other groups unable to gain equal footing, exposing the system’s fragility in fostering principled democratic political entities, and heightening the likelihood of nondemocratic governance or elite rule (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).

Abandon ship

Consider the cases of the Philippines’ most prominent parties: Liberal Party (LP), Lakas-Christian Muslim Democrats (CMD), and Partido Demokratiko Pilipino-Lakas ng Bayan (PDP-Laban). Following former President Benigno Aquino III’s victory in the 2010 elections under the LP banner, party membership surged from under 30 to 77, largely fueled by defectors from then-incumbent former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s Lakas-CMD. Subsequently, Lakas-CMD witnessed a decline in membership  after the 2013 midterm elections, plummeting from 60 to 12. A similar trend emerged when former President Rodrigo Duterte’s party, PDP-Laban, amassed 121 members in the House of Representatives prior to the 2019 elections. 

After the defeat of their presidential contenders, LP currently struggles with membership figures, and the once 121-member strong Lower House presence of PDP-Laban was humbled to a mere 15 after the election of President Marcos, Jr. The once-dominant Liberal Party that started during the Commonwealth period and PDP-Laban that once held a “supermajority” of 290 representatives under its coalition in the House of Representatives now both have dreadful memberships.

Indeed, deserters are seen as survivors, free to flutter away to another ship.

As the May 12, 2025 midterm elections draw near, what motivates politicians to shift to another party with virtually identical platforms, thereby disrupting their own momentum?

Party-switching is advantageous to traditional politicians or trapos (a term describing corrupt politicians from the elite class, also meaning dirty rag in Filipino) who only care about their interests and survival. The President, with his party, sets the trend of the economic and fiscal outlook of the country for the next six years. By strategically aligning themselves with the president’s party, trapos can sway the president to secure their piece of the government pie and use their affiliation with the ruling party to support them come next elections. 

This bandwagoning reveals a lack of behavioral routinization in parties. Rather than committing to their original party’s ideology, trapos often switch parties to capitalize on the advantages of aligning with the President.

With all popularly elected and powerful politicians in the Philippines’ presidential system being part of the same party, checks and balances are compromised. This undermines accountability and creates a scenario where the president and his cronies can push through populist policies unchecked, thereby heightening the risk of nondemocratic tendencies (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 35).

When allies of the incumbent receive more advantages and have more power to impose their office-seeking and clientelistic pursuits at the expense of people’s rights and liberties, while minority parties/politicians bear the burden of being the opposition in the face of the “supermajority,” the inequality of power and resources between political actors who support the president and those who do not affects democracy’s ability to consolidate. This impedes democracy’s inherent redistributive function, which aims to curtail the dominance of the elite and ensure equitable governance for all (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 37-38).

Shifting sands

Political turncoatism demonstrates the lack of programmatic parties that market their ideas collectively and gather their party members to represent these beliefs (Kitschelt 1995). While LP promotes liberty of the people, Lakas-CMD adheres to a centrist ideology, and PDP-Laban claims to adhere to five basic principles of Theism, Humanism, Enlightened Nationalism, Shared Prosperity, and Consultative and Participatory Democracy, these stated principles and ideologies that form their platforms are rarely valued or respected by their members. Moreover, even when acknowledged, most of these principles are so broad and similar to one another that discerning voters may fail to distinguish or even care about their differences.

The lack of adherence to party principles reflects a disorganized civil society unable to foster coordinated groups capable of upholding principles and safeguarding democracy amidst the looming specter of authoritarianism bolstered by patronage-based coalitions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006, 31).

Having the right fit

Granted, several bills have been introduced to thwart political butterflies, but none of these have been enacted into law. Such a crucial task must be done by those untainted by the allure of party switching, which may come from parties that can impose party discipline on their members and have a genuine platform that entices politicians and voters to commit to it. When will such a group emerge?

If you want to plant something firmly in the ground, you must first select the right plant and soil. Similarly, bills that prevent or limit political turncoatism will not pass unless the right party comes and the political environment is prepared to create the appropriate conditions for its growth. Despite numerous bills being filed, signaling that institutionalizing the political party system is in the pipeline of politicians, their passage remains unlikely as long as the majority of lawmakers are unwilling to draw definitive and long-lasting ideological/programmatic lines and the incentives for them to plant their roots deeply in their own parties are not laid out. Such inclinations and incentives may come from fostering an anti-political butterfly culture where voters place precedence on ethics, integrity, and commitment to democratic values; traits that enhance public trust. In the Philippines where butterflies thrive by being clientelistic and personality-driven, a healthy dose of polarization may be nothing more than an elusive aspiration. 

References

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. “2. Our Argument.” In Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, 15-46. N.p.: Cambridge University Press.

Kitschelt, Herbert. 1995. “Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies: Theoretical Propositions.” Party Politics 1, no. 4 (October): 447-472. doi: 10.1177/1354068895001004002.

Levitsky, Steven. 1998. “Institutionalization and Peronism: The Concept, the Case and the Case for Unpacking the Concept.” Party Politics 4, no. 1 (January): 77-92. https://doi.org/10.1177/1354068898004001004.

Teehankee, Julio C. 2018. “Institutionalizing political party reforms in the Philippines.” In Building Inclusive Democracies In Asean, edited by Ronald U. Mendoza, Edsel L. Beja Jr, Julio C. Teehankee, Antonio G M. La Vina, and Maria F. Villamejor-mendoza. N.p.: World Scientific Publishing Company.

Ufen, Andreas. 2008. “Political party and party system institutionalization in Southeast Asia: lessons for democratic consolidation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.” The Pacific Review 21, no. 3 (July): 327-350. https://doi.org/10.1080/09512740802134174.