Divide and conquer – it is the ultimate strategy to bring downfall to a rather mighty opponent. Empires past have fallen to the same tactic; facing their ruin fragmented, alienated, and apart from one another. One could say that the art of politics is the same, especially for Thaksin Shinawatra, who’s name reverberates through the political chasms of Thai politics until now.

Tumultuous would not suffice to describe the arena of Thailand politics during the turn of the new century. From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, Thailand ushered in a myriad of conflict-ridden problems; the widening income gap, unequal growth between rural and urban areas, and swelling poverty, in contrast to a rapidly-developing economy. Moreover, Thai politics during the 2000s was characterized by persistent bouts of military coups, monarchical intervention, and elite capture. And from this grand sociopolitical and economic chaos rose a Goliath; someone that the military, the monarchy, and the ministry of Thailand did not expect – Thaksin Shinawatra.

The rise of Thaksin Shinawatra

From serving as a mere policeman to becoming the 23rd Prime Minister of the country – Thaksin Shinawatra’s name has dominated Thai politics as both businessman, party leader, and the supreme leader of the Thailand people. His protracted approach to consolidate electoral support seemed to work; mobilizing dissatisfaction from rural voters, consolidating elite support from his business ties, and propagandizing control over media corporations, and pairing these with a personally charismatic and populist leadership style.

Thaksin Shinawatra managed to last for seven years – all the while damaging democratic institutions. His regime had persistent bouts of executive overreach; even going as far as preventing opposition parties from gaining power. Thaksin was also caught in corruption allegations, which he constantly veiled by censoring the media. Beyond that, he also cultivated a hostile civil society that often led to violent confrontations between his loyalists and the fragmented political opposition.

And as all empires, Thaksin’s rule came falling down during the ouster of 2006, when he was out of the country to attend that year’s UN General Assembly. The military once again took the helms – deposing the populist leader out of power, and out of the country. What came after, however, was a series of volatile, unstable, and divisive military-backed governments that are unable to achieve political longevity and quell his remaining support. So, the ultimate question remains: how did Thaksin do it? How did Thaksin Shinawatra divide and conquer Thailand politics, even after he fell from grace nearly two decades ago?

Thaksin’s divide-and-conquer: A polarized Thailand

Jennifer McCoy, a renowned scholar on democratization, polarization, and conflict management, posits that polarization usually happens when there is an obvious divide between two or more factions within society. This polarization may indeed worsen, leading to pernicious polarization – the division of society into two, mutually distrustful and antagonistic factions that ae constantly hostile, volatile, and at worst, violent towards each other. This usually happens when political entrepreneurs, such as populists, weaponize deep-seated social tensions and establish rhetoric, policy, and action from these divides.

Thaksin Shinawatra is a pertinent example of such a successful political entrepreneur. His campaigns during the 2001 elections centered around the rural-urban divide; bifurcating Thai society into along geopolitical lines – the impoverished, underdeveloped “rural,” and the industrialized, well-funded “urban.” When he won, his 30-Baht Scheme tremendously alleviated healthcare inaccessibility within rural areas, universalizing medical care for the rural poor at the expense of the urban upper and middle-class. Thaksin’s preferential treatment towards the poor allowed him to secure votes from the periphery, while simultaneously angering the urban center; creating resentment between the rural and urban populations.

This friction caused by Thaksin’s preferential treatment gave rise to two major factions: the Red Shirts – the rural, working-class voters who support and defer to Thaksin’s government, and the Yellow Shirts – the urban middle-class, the military, and the political elite who were critical of the populist Prime Minister. Hostilities between the two groups often led to violent riots, especially during large-scale rallies and protests, which inevitably made polarized tensions more entrenched into Thai politics.

Aside from eroding democracy through persistent executive overreach, mainly towards the judiciary and the Electoral Commission, Thaksin Shinawatra’s most devastating effect in Thailand politics is his polarizing effect to the Thai people themselves. It is mainly his divisive, populist policies and rhetoric that autocratized Thailand. Upon his ouster, the hardline divisions entrenched by his “us-versus-them” narrative continued to cleave Thai society. Violent tensions between the loyalist Red Shirts and the opposition Yellow Shirts continued.

The pains of pernicious polarization

After the interim military government ceded power to the democratically-elected People Power Party (PPP) in 2007, Thaksin-allied Samak Sundaravej found himself as the Prime Minister, which was short-lived after the Constitutional Court disqualified him in 2008 for receiving compensation for hosting a cooking show while serving his premiership. This decision was largely attributed to a Yellow Shirt-led protest, involving the occupation of two Bangkok airports, which lasted for eight from November 25 to December 3, 2008. These protests actively called for the dissolution of the PPP, and thereby the disqualification of Samak Sundaravej, who the Yellow Shirts accused of being a Thaksin puppet.

Thaksin’s polarizing influence to Thailand’s politics continued even after, with the 2010 Red Shirt protests – a series of violent riots and rallies organized by the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) – calling for the dissolution of the Yellow Shirt-led Parliament, and the removal of Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, who became Prime Minister upon the PPP’s fall in 2008. These protests lasted for two months; simmering tensions started in March, as Red Shirt rallies were often met with military crackdowns from the Yellow Shirt-dominated government. From then on, protests became increasingly violent and hostile between the two factions – culminating with the Thai government declaring a state of emergency that plunged the country back to military authoritarianism for another seven months, before it was lifted in December of the same year. The 2010 Red Shirts protests recorded 90 deaths and 2000 injured persons, becoming the worst case of military-versus-civilian conflict in the post-Thaksin era.

Collecting the spoils: who actually won?

In the end, who actually won from Thaksin Shinawatra’s divide-and-conquer stratagem? It was not Thaksin, nor is it the Red Shirts. Not even the Yellow Shirts can claim victory after Thaksin’s fall from grace. The political bedlam that followed ensured nothing but the further descent of Thailand into military authoritarianism. Due to persistent violence and antagonism from the polarized Thai society; the Royal Thai Armed Forces gained so much political power over the years.

Constant military interventions were observed during interregnums and even during short democratic breaks where the electorate voted parties into the Parliament democratically. The pernicious polarization led to repetitive bouts of polarized tensions translating to violence and political chaos, forcing the military to intervene perennially, which also gave them too much power. This prolonged military interference and coups entrenched authoritarianism into the very fabric of the country’s political system, making it harder for Thailand to find its way back to democracy.

Threading through the post-Thaksin turmoil

Not all is lost for Thailand. Together, they can find a way out of the massive political chasms that Thaksin has brought upon them; healing their way out of the polarized nature of their politics, and regain power back to the people. Broad strokes in reconciling rifts, especially in terms of access to government, must be done in order to bridge the causes of division along rural and urban lines. Electoral reforms must also adopt mixed-member electoral systems or proportional representation mechanisms to change incentives; rewarding political parties that foster inclusive alliances rather than pursuing winner-takes-all strategies.

And most importantly, all of Thailand society must have the sheer will to redefine their own politics. Beyond the structural problems that need reform, it is ultimately the agency of each Thai citizen that drives the change that their country sorely needs. They must strive to remain informed; to never be swayed by political discontent and appeals to anger or distrust, and pursue political choices where everyone could win. Ultimately, their political fate lies not in Thaksin, the monarchy, nor the military, but in themselves alone – lest they remain lost, divided, and conquered.